in round sixty-nine—with a different team, years after the Devil Rays failed to sign him.
The Devil Rays’ first two drafts underscored the risks that come with drafting raw high school athletes, especially when the top pick comes well after the top ten. But the D-Rays weren’t going to deviate from their plan, even after some of the earliest high school picks flamed out.
“We were facing tough competition in the American League East,” said LaMar. “We also had the mentality that it was going to be rough going for a while, but that we wanted to eventually build a championship organization. We also knew that our payroll, for the most part, was not going to be what some of the other clubs would have. So we took the chance on high school players, knowing that if you hit on them, you had a chance to hit big.”
LaMar shot himself in the foot after the 1997 season, blowing the Devil Rays’ first-, second-, and third-round picks in ’98 by signing veteran free agents Roberto Hernandez, Wilson Alvarez, and Dave Martinez; the Hernandez and Alvarez deals cost the team a combined $63 million in salary. Vince Naimoli and his let’s-win-now-at-all-costs partners weren’t as involved with these signings asthey were in the creation of the ill-fated Hit Show. But LaMar did feel some ownership pressure to bring in proven veterans for the Devil Rays’ debut season—though he should have known better than to blow the team’s top three draft picks in the process. Two years later, the D-Rays would sacrifice their second-, third-, and fourth-round picks by signing another passel of veterans. As shortsighted, ill advised, and counterproductive as it was to blow tens of millions of dollars on aging veterans in those early Devil Rays years, punting high draft picks to sign them was even more indefensible.
“We’d be sitting there waiting to pick, and in the meantime our draft boards were getting decimated—it was difficult to keep morale,” said Jennings. “You look at some of the drafts we had after that, and we ended up doing okay. But overall, they still didn’t have the impact we were looking for.”
Despite losing valuable picks, Jennings and his staff of scouts and cross-checkers finally found some draft success in ’98. The Devil Rays grabbed Aubrey Huff in the fifth round, Joe Kennedy in the eighth, and Brandon Backe in the eighteenth, landing one very good major league hitter and two serviceable big league pitchers. Still, Huff, like Toby Hall before him, was a college draftee. After three years of drafts, the Devil Rays had scooped up a handful of players who would go on to become useful major leaguers. But the master plan to stock the farm system with high-upside high schoolers had yet to get started—owing to MLB’s draft restrictions for the first three Tampa Bay drafts, the free-agent largesse of LaMar and the Devil Rays’ owners, and a bunch of plain old whiffs.
It was the 1999 draft, however, where a few real signs of promise finally emerged. Despite losing out on Albert Pujols, four of the team’s top five picks would make it to the big leagues. In the third round, the team pulled a Devil Rays exacta, not only targeting a big high school right-handed starter but also grabbing a local kid in Doug Waechter, a product of St. Pete’s Northeast High School. Another imposing high school righty, Seth McClung of West Virginia, came in the fifth round.
The best Devil Ray of the bunch—in fact, the best Devil Rayever for quite some time—would prove to be the team’s second-round pick, high school phenom Carl Crawford. Skeptics wondered if Crawford merely looked good in high school owing to poor competition in the Houston circuit in which he played. He didn’t play in the big showcases that other top prospects attended. His split focus on football and baseball led critics to wonder if he could refine his raw baseball tools into playable skills. Crawford proved the doubters wrong, honing his baseball skills
The Devil Rays’ first two drafts underscored the risks that come with drafting raw high school athletes, especially when the top pick comes well after the top ten. But the D-Rays weren’t going to deviate from their plan, even after some of the earliest high school picks flamed out.
“We were facing tough competition in the American League East,” said LaMar. “We also had the mentality that it was going to be rough going for a while, but that we wanted to eventually build a championship organization. We also knew that our payroll, for the most part, was not going to be what some of the other clubs would have. So we took the chance on high school players, knowing that if you hit on them, you had a chance to hit big.”
LaMar shot himself in the foot after the 1997 season, blowing the Devil Rays’ first-, second-, and third-round picks in ’98 by signing veteran free agents Roberto Hernandez, Wilson Alvarez, and Dave Martinez; the Hernandez and Alvarez deals cost the team a combined $63 million in salary. Vince Naimoli and his let’s-win-now-at-all-costs partners weren’t as involved with these signings asthey were in the creation of the ill-fated Hit Show. But LaMar did feel some ownership pressure to bring in proven veterans for the Devil Rays’ debut season—though he should have known better than to blow the team’s top three draft picks in the process. Two years later, the D-Rays would sacrifice their second-, third-, and fourth-round picks by signing another passel of veterans. As shortsighted, ill advised, and counterproductive as it was to blow tens of millions of dollars on aging veterans in those early Devil Rays years, punting high draft picks to sign them was even more indefensible.
“We’d be sitting there waiting to pick, and in the meantime our draft boards were getting decimated—it was difficult to keep morale,” said Jennings. “You look at some of the drafts we had after that, and we ended up doing okay. But overall, they still didn’t have the impact we were looking for.”
Despite losing valuable picks, Jennings and his staff of scouts and cross-checkers finally found some draft success in ’98. The Devil Rays grabbed Aubrey Huff in the fifth round, Joe Kennedy in the eighth, and Brandon Backe in the eighteenth, landing one very good major league hitter and two serviceable big league pitchers. Still, Huff, like Toby Hall before him, was a college draftee. After three years of drafts, the Devil Rays had scooped up a handful of players who would go on to become useful major leaguers. But the master plan to stock the farm system with high-upside high schoolers had yet to get started—owing to MLB’s draft restrictions for the first three Tampa Bay drafts, the free-agent largesse of LaMar and the Devil Rays’ owners, and a bunch of plain old whiffs.
It was the 1999 draft, however, where a few real signs of promise finally emerged. Despite losing out on Albert Pujols, four of the team’s top five picks would make it to the big leagues. In the third round, the team pulled a Devil Rays exacta, not only targeting a big high school right-handed starter but also grabbing a local kid in Doug Waechter, a product of St. Pete’s Northeast High School. Another imposing high school righty, Seth McClung of West Virginia, came in the fifth round.
The best Devil Ray of the bunch—in fact, the best Devil Rayever for quite some time—would prove to be the team’s second-round pick, high school phenom Carl Crawford. Skeptics wondered if Crawford merely looked good in high school owing to poor competition in the Houston circuit in which he played. He didn’t play in the big showcases that other top prospects attended. His split focus on football and baseball led critics to wonder if he could refine his raw baseball tools into playable skills. Crawford proved the doubters wrong, honing his baseball skills
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