population of Palestine would rise up against both the majority and minority reports. In the case of the majority report, the rising would "command universal support"; as to the minority report, "the rising might still be fairly successful."62 Azzam, the Arab League secretary-general, reacted both passionately and analytically: "[To the Arab peoples] you are not an [existing] fact-you [the Jews] are a temporary phenomenon. Centuries ago, the crusaders established themselves in our midst against our will, and in 200 years we ejected them.... Up to the very last moment, and beyond, they [the Arabs] will fight to prevent you from establishing your State. In no circumstances will they agree to it." But Azzam added that, in the past, the Arabs had "once had Spain, and then we lost Spain, and we have become accustomed to not having Spain.... Whether at any point we shall become accustomed to not have a part of Palestine, I cannot say. The chances are against it, since 4oo,ooo of our brethren will be unwilling citizens of your State. They will never recognize it, and they will never make peace. "63
But UNSCOP had delivered its judgment. What could or would the Arab states do? While blustering, they generally acknowledged their military weakness. Adil Arslan, one of Syrian president Shukri al-Quwwatli's advisers, later minister of defense, jotted down in his diary: "Poor Palestine, no matter what I say about defending it my heart remains a seething volcano because I cannot convince anyone of importance in my country or in the rest of the Arab countries that it needs anything more than words.... Because we have a small and ill-equipped army, we cannot stand up to the Zionist forces if they should suddenly decide to launch a strike at Damascus."64
British diplomats were surprised by the absence of mass demonstrations in the Arab world.65 The British saw the majority report as grossly unfair to the Arabs (Alexander Cadogan, the UK's representative to the United Nations, commented: "The majority plan is so manifestly unjust to the Arabs that it is difficult to see how we could reconcile it with our conscience").66 Yet the official response was born of realpolitik, not moral qualms: the cabinet resolved, in a secret decision on 20 September, to quit Palestine completely; but the British would not enforce or shepherd partition. As Creech Jones, the colonial secretary, predicted, Palestine would be overtaken by "a state of chaos. "67 In other words, either the United Nations would set up the machinery for resolving the conflict and an orderly transfer of power or the Arabs and the Jews would settle the problem on their own, by force of arms. In either case, it was no longer Britain's responsibility.
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY PARTITION RESOLUTION, 29 NOVEMBER 1947
On 26 September Creech Jones announced at the UN General Assembly, sitting as the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine, that Britain planned "an early withdrawal." Over the next two months, on the basis of the UNSCOP recommendations, three specially appointed subcommittees of the Ad Hoc Committee hammered out the terms of the resolution to be submitted to the General Assembly.68
All sides mounted intensive lobbying campaigns. The atmosphere was overheated: "The whole of New York," of course, was "mad," "so vast, so dirty, so crushing to the individual," one Jewish Agency emissary reported.69 More to the point, for Walter Eytan, who had "studied the map of the United Nations very, very thoroughly"70 and now orchestrated the Zionist contacts at Lake Success (where the General Assembly was meeting), were the activities of the hostile British delegation, "held to be the ablest of all the delegations" in the international body.71 Moreover, Eytan was concerned about his own staff of Jewish Agency Political Department "diplomats" and the attached American Zionist officials-who, he said, were motivated by a "hunt after kavod [glory, honor], ambitions, considerations of prestige, etc.-all playing
But UNSCOP had delivered its judgment. What could or would the Arab states do? While blustering, they generally acknowledged their military weakness. Adil Arslan, one of Syrian president Shukri al-Quwwatli's advisers, later minister of defense, jotted down in his diary: "Poor Palestine, no matter what I say about defending it my heart remains a seething volcano because I cannot convince anyone of importance in my country or in the rest of the Arab countries that it needs anything more than words.... Because we have a small and ill-equipped army, we cannot stand up to the Zionist forces if they should suddenly decide to launch a strike at Damascus."64
British diplomats were surprised by the absence of mass demonstrations in the Arab world.65 The British saw the majority report as grossly unfair to the Arabs (Alexander Cadogan, the UK's representative to the United Nations, commented: "The majority plan is so manifestly unjust to the Arabs that it is difficult to see how we could reconcile it with our conscience").66 Yet the official response was born of realpolitik, not moral qualms: the cabinet resolved, in a secret decision on 20 September, to quit Palestine completely; but the British would not enforce or shepherd partition. As Creech Jones, the colonial secretary, predicted, Palestine would be overtaken by "a state of chaos. "67 In other words, either the United Nations would set up the machinery for resolving the conflict and an orderly transfer of power or the Arabs and the Jews would settle the problem on their own, by force of arms. In either case, it was no longer Britain's responsibility.
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY PARTITION RESOLUTION, 29 NOVEMBER 1947
On 26 September Creech Jones announced at the UN General Assembly, sitting as the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine, that Britain planned "an early withdrawal." Over the next two months, on the basis of the UNSCOP recommendations, three specially appointed subcommittees of the Ad Hoc Committee hammered out the terms of the resolution to be submitted to the General Assembly.68
All sides mounted intensive lobbying campaigns. The atmosphere was overheated: "The whole of New York," of course, was "mad," "so vast, so dirty, so crushing to the individual," one Jewish Agency emissary reported.69 More to the point, for Walter Eytan, who had "studied the map of the United Nations very, very thoroughly"70 and now orchestrated the Zionist contacts at Lake Success (where the General Assembly was meeting), were the activities of the hostile British delegation, "held to be the ablest of all the delegations" in the international body.71 Moreover, Eytan was concerned about his own staff of Jewish Agency Political Department "diplomats" and the attached American Zionist officials-who, he said, were motivated by a "hunt after kavod [glory, honor], ambitions, considerations of prestige, etc.-all playing
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