to. If that person is an enemy of Putin, the Basmanny judges are pedantic; if he is a favorite, they do not get vexed over legal niceties, or even require him to attend the hearing.
Today Judge Stanislav Voznesensky was considering a claim from Nadezhda Bushmanova of Ryazan Province, the mother of Alexander Slesarenko, a soldier killed in the second Chechen war. Alexander was fighting in the Armavir special operations unit of the Interior Ministry.
In September 1999, at the very beginning of the second Chechen war, this unit was included in a special operations group under the command of Viktor Kazantsev, at that time commander of the North Caucasus military district. Kazantsev committed an error and Alexander, among many others, was killed. Here is what happened:
Everything began on September 5, officially the first day of the war, when Putin issued a decree to begin an “antiterrorist operation.” There was fighting in villages in Dagestan. At around 1700 hours the fighters occupied the Dagestan village of Novolakskoye on the border with Chechnya, and a unit of the Lipetsk militia special operations unit found itself holed up in the militia station. It needed rescuing. On the night of September 5 the 120 men of Special Operations Unit 15 were called into action. Among them was Alexander Slesarenko. On September 6 the unit was at the Mozdok army base in North Ossetia. On September 7 they were deployed to the Dagestan village of Batashyurt, and on September 8 to Novolakskoye. At this point the Armavir men came under the command of Kazantsev. He had been placed in overall charge of the operation to clear the Novolakskoye and Hasavyurt regions of Dagestan, and all categories of troops were under his command.
On September 8, Kazantsev ordered Maj. Gen. Nikolai Cherkashenko, his deputy in charge of the Interior troops, to present a plan to take the adjacent commanding heights in accordance with Kazantsev's generalinstruction. On September 9 Kazantsev approved the plan, and at 2130 hours Maj. Yury Yashin, commanding officer of the Armavir unit, received the order to attack and occupy and hold the heights until the arrival of reinforcements, so that fire could be directed down onto Novolakskoye.
The Armavir men did as they were ordered and moved in at top speed, deaf and naked, as they say in the army, without secure means of communication, using only open channel walkie-talkies with batteries that, because there had been no time to recharge them, were flat. How much ammunition they would need had not been calculated, because the Armavir men had not been told how long they would have to hold out. They were expendable, and anyway they didn't even belong to Kazan-tsev's regular forces.
The war in the Caucasus is very odd. All the federal troops are supposedly on the same side, but the reality is quite different. The soldiers under the Ministry of Defense are at daggers drawn with the FSB, and the Interior troops are at loggerheads both with their own Interior Ministry and the army. When officers say, “The casualties were not ours,” that means in army-speak that the fallen were militiamen or soldiers of the Interior troops. This is why a battle has been raging for many years over who should head the joint command of forces and resources in the North Caucasus. If an army man is in charge, there is no way non-army personnel will get the ammunition and walkie-talkies they need.
That is what happened on this occasion. Kazantsev, an army man, was in command of non-army men. By 0100 hours on September 10, ninety-four non-army special operations troops had occupied the heights without losses. At 0600 hours Major General Cherkashenko received a confident report from Major Yashin and passed the information to Kazantsev, who immediately drove off, reassured that the hills had been taken. He was absent until 0840 hours, but at precisely 0620 hours Yashin suddenly found himself with a battle on his hands. At 0730 hours Chechen
Today Judge Stanislav Voznesensky was considering a claim from Nadezhda Bushmanova of Ryazan Province, the mother of Alexander Slesarenko, a soldier killed in the second Chechen war. Alexander was fighting in the Armavir special operations unit of the Interior Ministry.
In September 1999, at the very beginning of the second Chechen war, this unit was included in a special operations group under the command of Viktor Kazantsev, at that time commander of the North Caucasus military district. Kazantsev committed an error and Alexander, among many others, was killed. Here is what happened:
Everything began on September 5, officially the first day of the war, when Putin issued a decree to begin an “antiterrorist operation.” There was fighting in villages in Dagestan. At around 1700 hours the fighters occupied the Dagestan village of Novolakskoye on the border with Chechnya, and a unit of the Lipetsk militia special operations unit found itself holed up in the militia station. It needed rescuing. On the night of September 5 the 120 men of Special Operations Unit 15 were called into action. Among them was Alexander Slesarenko. On September 6 the unit was at the Mozdok army base in North Ossetia. On September 7 they were deployed to the Dagestan village of Batashyurt, and on September 8 to Novolakskoye. At this point the Armavir men came under the command of Kazantsev. He had been placed in overall charge of the operation to clear the Novolakskoye and Hasavyurt regions of Dagestan, and all categories of troops were under his command.
On September 8, Kazantsev ordered Maj. Gen. Nikolai Cherkashenko, his deputy in charge of the Interior troops, to present a plan to take the adjacent commanding heights in accordance with Kazantsev's generalinstruction. On September 9 Kazantsev approved the plan, and at 2130 hours Maj. Yury Yashin, commanding officer of the Armavir unit, received the order to attack and occupy and hold the heights until the arrival of reinforcements, so that fire could be directed down onto Novolakskoye.
The Armavir men did as they were ordered and moved in at top speed, deaf and naked, as they say in the army, without secure means of communication, using only open channel walkie-talkies with batteries that, because there had been no time to recharge them, were flat. How much ammunition they would need had not been calculated, because the Armavir men had not been told how long they would have to hold out. They were expendable, and anyway they didn't even belong to Kazan-tsev's regular forces.
The war in the Caucasus is very odd. All the federal troops are supposedly on the same side, but the reality is quite different. The soldiers under the Ministry of Defense are at daggers drawn with the FSB, and the Interior troops are at loggerheads both with their own Interior Ministry and the army. When officers say, “The casualties were not ours,” that means in army-speak that the fallen were militiamen or soldiers of the Interior troops. This is why a battle has been raging for many years over who should head the joint command of forces and resources in the North Caucasus. If an army man is in charge, there is no way non-army personnel will get the ammunition and walkie-talkies they need.
That is what happened on this occasion. Kazantsev, an army man, was in command of non-army men. By 0100 hours on September 10, ninety-four non-army special operations troops had occupied the heights without losses. At 0600 hours Major General Cherkashenko received a confident report from Major Yashin and passed the information to Kazantsev, who immediately drove off, reassured that the hills had been taken. He was absent until 0840 hours, but at precisely 0620 hours Yashin suddenly found himself with a battle on his hands. At 0730 hours Chechen
Similar Books
