fearful information about the raping of nuns and gouging out of priests’ eyes. Otherwise, censorship on Asturias was complete. In the countryside, landlords celebrated by abandoning any willingness to collaborate with agrarian reform, evictions were carried on apace and those socialists who had avoided imprisonment received short shrift in the pursuit of employment. Further resentments were, therefore, created.
12
The years 1929–32 were the period of world depression; a bad time for a government to take power anywhere. True, had it not been for the depression, Primo de Rivera might not have fallen in Spain. But his successors did not act as if they realized the nature of the economic crisis, though they themselves had been borne to power partly by it. Azaña and his ministers behaved as if they thought they were dealing primarily with constitutional or cultural problems. Even the socialist ministers (between 1931 and 1933, Prieto and Largo Caballero were ministers of finance and of labour) did not seem to realize the needs, in a world financial crisis, of the economy. Partly because the ministers were inexperienced, partly because there was doubt about their policies, and partly because no one had money with which to take risks, the Spanish rich and the international financial community were hostile to the republic to begin with. Prieto’s arrival at the ministry of finance led, first, to the withdrawal of a loan from J. P. Morgan, negotiated by his immediate predecessor under the King, Juan Ventosa. The church burnings in May 1931 delayed the reopening of negotiations for it. There was a run on the peseta throughout 1931. Prieto later did his best to protect the currency, negotiating with Russia to buy oil at 18 per cent less than that offered by English and US companies, and insisting on licenses for foreign equipment. 1
Nevertheless, throughout 1931, Prieto, for all the world as if he were an orthodox governor of the Bank of England, concentrated on trying to stabilize the peseta. His even more orthodox successor as minister of finance, Jaime Carner, did the same. They did prevent the international quotation for the peseta from dropping faster than it had before: the consequence was that, while the international value of the peseta declined by 25 per cent between 1929 and 1931, it only fell a little over 10 per cent in 1932, and remained thereafter stable until 1936. It is arguable that, had it not been for the continuing political uncertainty, the number of strikes, and the threats of revolution from Left and Right, the peseta would have increased its value by 1934. It would seem improbable, at all events, that right-wing or international financial conspiracies can be blamed for the fall of the republic, whatever Juan March might have been doing with his money.
Industry was in these years at a low level for reasons largely out of Spain’s control. The figures are dispiriting: taking 1929 as a base of 100, the index of industrial production was below that in 1935; after the elections of 1936, the index fell to 77. The index of share prices was still more gloomy. Again with 1929 as a base, prices had fallen to 63 in 1935. 1 The most depressed side of the Spanish economy were the mines: less coal, than other minerals. Coal production certainly fell, though only moderately, from 7 million tons in 1931, to just under 6 in 1934, rallying to 7 in 1935. Spanish coal could not, however, compete with English prices and, if citrus fruit exports were not to suffer, some English coal had regularly to be imported to balance trade. On the other hand, the mining of manganese ore dropped to nearly nothing in 1935; production of pyrites, potash and pig iron fell by over a third between 1930 and 1935; lead, zinc, silver, tungsten and copper by over a half; and iron ore by a quarter. Steel production fell steadily from 1,000,000 tons in 1929 to 580,000 in 1935, not only because of world conditions but because the republic needed
12
The years 1929–32 were the period of world depression; a bad time for a government to take power anywhere. True, had it not been for the depression, Primo de Rivera might not have fallen in Spain. But his successors did not act as if they realized the nature of the economic crisis, though they themselves had been borne to power partly by it. Azaña and his ministers behaved as if they thought they were dealing primarily with constitutional or cultural problems. Even the socialist ministers (between 1931 and 1933, Prieto and Largo Caballero were ministers of finance and of labour) did not seem to realize the needs, in a world financial crisis, of the economy. Partly because the ministers were inexperienced, partly because there was doubt about their policies, and partly because no one had money with which to take risks, the Spanish rich and the international financial community were hostile to the republic to begin with. Prieto’s arrival at the ministry of finance led, first, to the withdrawal of a loan from J. P. Morgan, negotiated by his immediate predecessor under the King, Juan Ventosa. The church burnings in May 1931 delayed the reopening of negotiations for it. There was a run on the peseta throughout 1931. Prieto later did his best to protect the currency, negotiating with Russia to buy oil at 18 per cent less than that offered by English and US companies, and insisting on licenses for foreign equipment. 1
Nevertheless, throughout 1931, Prieto, for all the world as if he were an orthodox governor of the Bank of England, concentrated on trying to stabilize the peseta. His even more orthodox successor as minister of finance, Jaime Carner, did the same. They did prevent the international quotation for the peseta from dropping faster than it had before: the consequence was that, while the international value of the peseta declined by 25 per cent between 1929 and 1931, it only fell a little over 10 per cent in 1932, and remained thereafter stable until 1936. It is arguable that, had it not been for the continuing political uncertainty, the number of strikes, and the threats of revolution from Left and Right, the peseta would have increased its value by 1934. It would seem improbable, at all events, that right-wing or international financial conspiracies can be blamed for the fall of the republic, whatever Juan March might have been doing with his money.
Industry was in these years at a low level for reasons largely out of Spain’s control. The figures are dispiriting: taking 1929 as a base of 100, the index of industrial production was below that in 1935; after the elections of 1936, the index fell to 77. The index of share prices was still more gloomy. Again with 1929 as a base, prices had fallen to 63 in 1935. 1 The most depressed side of the Spanish economy were the mines: less coal, than other minerals. Coal production certainly fell, though only moderately, from 7 million tons in 1931, to just under 6 in 1934, rallying to 7 in 1935. Spanish coal could not, however, compete with English prices and, if citrus fruit exports were not to suffer, some English coal had regularly to be imported to balance trade. On the other hand, the mining of manganese ore dropped to nearly nothing in 1935; production of pyrites, potash and pig iron fell by over a third between 1930 and 1935; lead, zinc, silver, tungsten and copper by over a half; and iron ore by a quarter. Steel production fell steadily from 1,000,000 tons in 1929 to 580,000 in 1935, not only because of world conditions but because the republic needed
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