less steel than Primo had needed: there was no Moroccan war to service, while the republic, like all governments in the 1930s,believed in roads, not railway expansion. Some sectors, however, did well during the republic—electric power, from increased development of hydro-electric plants, increased by nearly half between 1926 and 1936. So did building. In truth, most countries (the USA, Britain, France and Germany) had worse problems in the depression than Spain. Thus while Spain’s index of industrial production had dropped over 10 per cent, German and US production dropped nearly 50 per cent in 1932.
The most resilient of ministers in the face of these difficulties was Prieto who, when moved from the ministry of finance to that of public works, devoted much time and investment to dams, irrigation schemes and reforestation, assisting agriculture as well as hydroelectric power. He electrified some railways, began underground central terminals in Barcelona and Madrid, completed Primo’s scheme for a Guadarrama train tunnel, and built many roads. It is easy to imagine how large a part schemes of this nature would have played in any government of the centre which he would have directed.
Agricultural figures were more encouraging in the first years of the republic. Production of wheat, maize and rice either maintained past levels, or even showed an advance. Fish caught off Spanish coasts increased by a third. 1 The area devoted to production of oranges between 1931 and 1935 was nearly half as much again as it was in 1926, while exports of oranges also rose to a record high figure in the years of the republic—reaching (principally to Britain) over 20 per cent of Spanish exports. 2 (The increase was chiefly due to the decline in other exports, such as wine and olive oil.) Nevertheless, as expected, overall export figures in the middle thirties were only about a quarter of the levels obtained in 1930.
Such figures need to be reckoned against the consistent rise in population—nearly 1 per cent a year—so that conditions were worse for a larger population. 3 100,000 emigrant workers also returned in the1930s, chiefly from Cuba or South America, and further emigration was impossible. 1
The economy of Spain was, therefore, marked by mildly declining industrial production, a severe decline in the mines, static or mildly increasing agricultural production and rising population. Prices remained fairly constant: food was cheap in relation to lodging, as were clothes. But political circumstances naturally dominated the consequences. Between 1931 and 1933, for example, wages rose as a result of Largo Caballero’s measures and of a wave of strikes with which the employers felt they had no alternative save to settle, for political reasons. 2 The eventual result after 1933 was layings-off, dismissals, closing of factories—and higher unemployment: indeed, unemployment rose steadily during the republic. Figures are not easy to decide upon; but if, as seems probable, the unemployed numbered 400,000 after the republic had been in existence for nine months in December 1931, they had probably risen to 600,000 by December 1933. 3
The situation changed during the
bienio negro,
the two years of radical, centrist, and CEDA government between late 1933 and early 1936. Employers now had no political anxiety about standing up to wage demands. They had the police, the civil guard and the army behind them, and the workers knew it. So, not only did wages not go up, but they were lowered in many places, without any commensurate drop in prices. The consequence, as has been seen, was the agricultural strike of early 1934, followed by the revolution and general strike of October 1934. Political feelings were thereafter worsened beyond cure, particularly since so many workers’ leaders were imprisoned. But the rate of increase at least in unemployment was lowered. After February 1936, the stock exchange declined, production fell and, this time, the
The most resilient of ministers in the face of these difficulties was Prieto who, when moved from the ministry of finance to that of public works, devoted much time and investment to dams, irrigation schemes and reforestation, assisting agriculture as well as hydroelectric power. He electrified some railways, began underground central terminals in Barcelona and Madrid, completed Primo’s scheme for a Guadarrama train tunnel, and built many roads. It is easy to imagine how large a part schemes of this nature would have played in any government of the centre which he would have directed.
Agricultural figures were more encouraging in the first years of the republic. Production of wheat, maize and rice either maintained past levels, or even showed an advance. Fish caught off Spanish coasts increased by a third. 1 The area devoted to production of oranges between 1931 and 1935 was nearly half as much again as it was in 1926, while exports of oranges also rose to a record high figure in the years of the republic—reaching (principally to Britain) over 20 per cent of Spanish exports. 2 (The increase was chiefly due to the decline in other exports, such as wine and olive oil.) Nevertheless, as expected, overall export figures in the middle thirties were only about a quarter of the levels obtained in 1930.
Such figures need to be reckoned against the consistent rise in population—nearly 1 per cent a year—so that conditions were worse for a larger population. 3 100,000 emigrant workers also returned in the1930s, chiefly from Cuba or South America, and further emigration was impossible. 1
The economy of Spain was, therefore, marked by mildly declining industrial production, a severe decline in the mines, static or mildly increasing agricultural production and rising population. Prices remained fairly constant: food was cheap in relation to lodging, as were clothes. But political circumstances naturally dominated the consequences. Between 1931 and 1933, for example, wages rose as a result of Largo Caballero’s measures and of a wave of strikes with which the employers felt they had no alternative save to settle, for political reasons. 2 The eventual result after 1933 was layings-off, dismissals, closing of factories—and higher unemployment: indeed, unemployment rose steadily during the republic. Figures are not easy to decide upon; but if, as seems probable, the unemployed numbered 400,000 after the republic had been in existence for nine months in December 1931, they had probably risen to 600,000 by December 1933. 3
The situation changed during the
bienio negro,
the two years of radical, centrist, and CEDA government between late 1933 and early 1936. Employers now had no political anxiety about standing up to wage demands. They had the police, the civil guard and the army behind them, and the workers knew it. So, not only did wages not go up, but they were lowered in many places, without any commensurate drop in prices. The consequence, as has been seen, was the agricultural strike of early 1934, followed by the revolution and general strike of October 1934. Political feelings were thereafter worsened beyond cure, particularly since so many workers’ leaders were imprisoned. But the rate of increase at least in unemployment was lowered. After February 1936, the stock exchange declined, production fell and, this time, the
Similar Books
