in the ability of democracies and nondemocracies to make intelligent decisions in the foreign-policy realm.See Michael C. Desch,
Power and Military Effectiveness: The Fallacy of Democratic Triumphalism
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008); Alexander B. Downes, “How Smart and Tough Are Democracies? Reassessing Theories of Democratic Victory in War,”
International Security
33, no. 4 (Spring 2009): 9–51; Sebastian Rosato, “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory,”
American Political Science Review
97, no. 4 (November 2003): 585–602.
Chapter 6
1 . This is not to say that a country’s master narrative about its past is simply comprised of myths; it may also contain some truthful stories.
2 . Stephen Van Evera, “Hypotheses on Nationalism and War,”
International Security
18, no. 4 (Spring 1994): 27.
3 . Ernest Renan, “What Is a Nation?” in Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds.,
Becoming National: A Reader
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 45.
4 . Dominique Moisi, “France Is Haunted by an Inability to Confront its Past,”
Financial Times
, December 12, 2005.
5 . Van Evera notes that “nationalist myths can help politically frail elites to bolster their grip on power,” and they can “bolster the authority and political power of incumbent elites” (“Hypotheses on Nationalism and War,” 30). While this is certainly true, selfish lies of this sort fall outside the scope of this book.
6 . The best book on this subject is Ronald Smelser and Edward J. Davies II,
The Myth of the Eastern Front: The Nazi-Soviet War in American Popular Culture
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). See also Omer Bartov,
Germany’s War and the Holocaust: Disputed Histories
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003); Paula Bradish,
Crimes of the German Wehrmacht: Dimensions of a War of Annihilation, 1941–1944
, exhibition brochure (Hamburg, Germany: Hamburg Institute for Social Research, 2004); Norbert Frei,
Adenauer’s Germany and the Nazi Past: The Politics of Amnesty and Intergration
, trans. Joel Golb (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Hannes Heer and Klaus Naumann, eds.,
War of Extermination: The German Military in World War II, 1941–1944
(New York: Berghahn Books, 2000); John J. Mearsheimer,
Liddell Hart and the Weight of History
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 178–201; Alaric Searle,
Wehrmacht Generals, West German Society,and the Debate on Rearmament, 1949–1959
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003); Wolfram Wette,
The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality
, trans. Deborah Lucas Schneider (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), chap. 5.
7 . Christopher Simpson,
Blowback: America’s Recruitment of Nazis and Its Effects on the Cold War
(New York: Collier Books, 1989), 158.
8 . On the myth about why the Palestinians fled their homes, see Erskine Childers, “The Other Exodus,”
Spectator
, May 12, 1961; Simha Flapan,
The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1987), 81–118; Walid Khalidi, “Why Did the Palestinians Leave, Revisited,”
Journal of Palestine Studies
34, no. 2 (Winter 2005): 42–54; Walid Khalidi, “The Fall of Haifa,”
Middle East Forum
35, no. 10 (December 1959): 22–32; Benny Morris,
The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited
, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Ilan Pappe,
The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine
(Oxford: Oneworld, 2006), 131. For analysis of other myths, see Flapan,
Birth of Israel;
Norman G. Finkelstein,
Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict
(London: Verso, 1995); John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt,
The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), chap. 3; Benny Morris,
Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881–1999
(New York: Knopf, 1999); Tom Segev,
One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs under the British Mandate
, trans. Haim Watzman (New York: Holt, 2001); Avi Shlaim,
The Iron Wall:
Power and Military Effectiveness: The Fallacy of Democratic Triumphalism
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008); Alexander B. Downes, “How Smart and Tough Are Democracies? Reassessing Theories of Democratic Victory in War,”
International Security
33, no. 4 (Spring 2009): 9–51; Sebastian Rosato, “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory,”
American Political Science Review
97, no. 4 (November 2003): 585–602.
Chapter 6
1 . This is not to say that a country’s master narrative about its past is simply comprised of myths; it may also contain some truthful stories.
2 . Stephen Van Evera, “Hypotheses on Nationalism and War,”
International Security
18, no. 4 (Spring 1994): 27.
3 . Ernest Renan, “What Is a Nation?” in Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds.,
Becoming National: A Reader
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 45.
4 . Dominique Moisi, “France Is Haunted by an Inability to Confront its Past,”
Financial Times
, December 12, 2005.
5 . Van Evera notes that “nationalist myths can help politically frail elites to bolster their grip on power,” and they can “bolster the authority and political power of incumbent elites” (“Hypotheses on Nationalism and War,” 30). While this is certainly true, selfish lies of this sort fall outside the scope of this book.
6 . The best book on this subject is Ronald Smelser and Edward J. Davies II,
The Myth of the Eastern Front: The Nazi-Soviet War in American Popular Culture
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). See also Omer Bartov,
Germany’s War and the Holocaust: Disputed Histories
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003); Paula Bradish,
Crimes of the German Wehrmacht: Dimensions of a War of Annihilation, 1941–1944
, exhibition brochure (Hamburg, Germany: Hamburg Institute for Social Research, 2004); Norbert Frei,
Adenauer’s Germany and the Nazi Past: The Politics of Amnesty and Intergration
, trans. Joel Golb (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Hannes Heer and Klaus Naumann, eds.,
War of Extermination: The German Military in World War II, 1941–1944
(New York: Berghahn Books, 2000); John J. Mearsheimer,
Liddell Hart and the Weight of History
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 178–201; Alaric Searle,
Wehrmacht Generals, West German Society,and the Debate on Rearmament, 1949–1959
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003); Wolfram Wette,
The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality
, trans. Deborah Lucas Schneider (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), chap. 5.
7 . Christopher Simpson,
Blowback: America’s Recruitment of Nazis and Its Effects on the Cold War
(New York: Collier Books, 1989), 158.
8 . On the myth about why the Palestinians fled their homes, see Erskine Childers, “The Other Exodus,”
Spectator
, May 12, 1961; Simha Flapan,
The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1987), 81–118; Walid Khalidi, “Why Did the Palestinians Leave, Revisited,”
Journal of Palestine Studies
34, no. 2 (Winter 2005): 42–54; Walid Khalidi, “The Fall of Haifa,”
Middle East Forum
35, no. 10 (December 1959): 22–32; Benny Morris,
The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited
, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Ilan Pappe,
The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine
(Oxford: Oneworld, 2006), 131. For analysis of other myths, see Flapan,
Birth of Israel;
Norman G. Finkelstein,
Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict
(London: Verso, 1995); John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt,
The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), chap. 3; Benny Morris,
Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881–1999
(New York: Knopf, 1999); Tom Segev,
One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs under the British Mandate
, trans. Haim Watzman (New York: Holt, 2001); Avi Shlaim,
The Iron Wall:
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